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1 .................................. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.2 The following members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, each ofwhom is either Chairman or Ranking Member of a subcommittee, also support this brief: Representative Fred Upton, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and theInternet; Representative Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member, Subcommittee onTelecommunications and the Internet; Representative Cliff Stearns, Chairman,Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection; Representative Janice D.Schakowsky, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and ConsumerProtection; Representative Rick Boucher, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energyand Air Quality; Representative Michael Bilirakis, Chairman, Subcommittee on Health;Representative Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Health;Representative Jim Greenwood, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight andInvestigations;  Representative Peter Deutsch, Ranking Member, Subcommittee onOversight and Investigations; Representative Paul E. Gillmor, Chairman, Subcommitteeon Environment and Hazardous Materials; and Representative Hilda L. Solis, RankingMember, Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials.
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Interest Of Amici1
Amici curiae are Representatives W.J. “Billy” Tauzin and John D. Dingell,the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Energy andCommerce, the authorizing committee with jurisdiction over the Federal TradeCommission.  Amici authored, and were integral in securing passage of, legislationsupporting the Commission’s “Do Not Call” rules at issue in this appeal.2  Amici have dual interests in this litigation.  First, amici have an institutionalinterest in ensuring that the judiciary upholds federal consumer protection laws andregulations that are consistent with Congressional enactments and the FirstAmendment.  Second, amici have a substantive interest in ensuring that the Courtunderstands the underlying basis of the Commission’s decision to regulatecommercial calls and non-commercial calls differently.  
3 By the same token, if an individual makes a company-specific request not to becalled and would otherwise fall within the established business relationship exception, aseller may not call the individual “regardless of whether the consumer does business withthe seller.”  68 Fed. Reg. at 4634.  See also 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(ii).
2
IntroductionIn 1995, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) promulgated telemarketingrules that prohibit “a seller or telemarketer [of goods or services] from calling aconsumer who has previously asked not to be called by or on behalf of that seller.” 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4629 (Jan. 29, 2003).  See also 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A). Earlier this year, the FTC amended its rules to make it easier for consumers toavoid telemarketing calls.  Under the revised rule, commonly known as the “DoNot Call” rule, individuals can choose to prohibit all commercial telemarketingcalls to their homes or cellular phones, with a limited exception for calls madepursuant to an established business relationship.  See 16 C.F.R. §310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B); 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629, 4632.  The revised FTC rules also, forthe first time, impose limitations on telemarketing for charitable donations; underthe new rules, individuals may prohibit calls to their homes by any charities thatthey specifically designate.  See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A); 68 Fed. Reg. at4629. Put together, the two provisions now authorize individuals to prohibit bothcommercial and charitable telephone solicitations in their homes.  The “Do NotCall” registry allows them to prohibit all commercial telemarketing; if they wouldlike to make company-specific exceptions to that general ban, they may do so bygiving commercial entities express permission to call them.  See 16 C.F.R. §310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i); 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629.3  There is no mechanism forprohibiting all charitable solicitations, but citizens may designate any specificcharity from which they do not wish to receive home solicitation calls.  Thedifference between the regulation of commercial telemarketing and charitablesolicitation is in the default rules:  citizens must take affirmative steps to receivecommercial telemarketing calls (once they have signed up with the “Do Not Call”registry) and to avoid charitable solicitations.   As set forth below, the FTC’s decision to regulate commercial telemarketingand non-commercial telemarketing differently was based on legislative andregulatory findings that:  (1) commercial solicitations are far more intrusive thannon-commercial solicitations; and (2) commercial telemarketers are more likely toengage in abusive practices than telemarketers soliciting for charities.  Thosefindings are more than adequate to support a system that allows citizens to prohibitcommercial telemarketing on a blanket basis and charitable solicitation on acharity-specific basis.  Accordingly, the Do Not Call rule does not impermissiblydiscriminate against commercial speech and is entirely consistent with the FirstAmendment.  
3ArgumentUnder well-established Supreme Court precedent, the federal governmenthas the power to regulate truthful commercial speech as long as:  (1) its interest issubstantial; (2) the regulation it proposes “directly advances” that interest; and (3)the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.  CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). In order to satisfy the second and third prongs of this test, the government needonly demonstrate a “reasonable fit” between the identified problem and thegovernment’s solution – not a “perfect fit.”  United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509U.S. 418, 429, 434 (1993) (“Nor do we require that the Government make progresson every front before it can make progress on any front.”); Bd. of Trustees v. Fox,492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, butreasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but onewhose scope is ’in proportion to the interest served’; that employs not necessarilythe least restrictive means but, . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desiredobjective”); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 656 n.4,658-59 (8th Cir. 2003).  And “reasonable fit” need not be shown by volumes ofscientific research or studies.  The standard is far more generous than that: “anecdotes . . . history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” all will suffice toshow both the extent of the problem and that the regulation in question willalleviate it.  Florida Bar v. Went For It., Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995); Nixon,323 F.3d at 654.  Finally, in reviewing regulations such as the Do Not Call rule, courts affordsubstantial deference to any legislative conclusions that informed the regulatorydecision at issue, because Congress is “’far better equipped than the judiciary to“amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data” bearing upon legislativequestions.’”  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997).  See also Cityof L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality); Fox, 492 U.S.at 478; Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1995).  In fact, the SupremeCourt has recognized that courts should afford “an additional measure ofdeference” to Congressional findings in applying the second and third prongs ofthe Central Hudson test, “lest [courts] infringe on traditional legislative authorityto make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy.” Turner, 520 U.S. at 196.Over the last twelve years, Congress has held numerous hearings andenacted several pieces of legislation addressing telemarketing abuses.  Throughthat process, Congress amassed a substantial legislative record on which the FTCrelied in promulgating the regulations at issue here.  As set forth below, that recordamply demonstrates that commercial telemarketing differs from charitable
4 The Supreme Court’s holding in Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks, Inc., 507 U.S.410 (1993), relied upon by plaintiffs, is not to the contrary.  In that case, there was noevidence – nor could there be – that people found commercial newsracks to be moreaesthetically unpleasant than newsracks containing newspapers and other non-commercialperiodicals.  See id. at 425-26.  Here, the record makes clear that solicitations bycommercial telemarketers are not only more invasive than non-commercial calls, but alsomore likely to be coercive or fraudulent and to swindle vulnerable individuals (such assenior citizens).  Moreover, unlike the regulation at issue in Discovery Networks, the rulesat issue here regulate both commercial and non-commercial speech.  They simplyregulate them differently because they raise different levels of concern.5 While the TCPA was not the statute that authorized the FTC to explore thepossibility of a “Do Not Call” registry, see infra at 9, it was the first statute in a series thatreflected the evolution of Congress’ thinking on the matter and its measured responses to
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solicitation in at least two respects relevant here.  First, citizens, as a general rule,consider commercial telemarketing far more intrusive than charitable solicitations. Second, commercial telemarketing is more prone to abuse than is charitablesolicitation.  Given those differences, the “fit” between the Do Not Call rule andthe chief concerns raised by telemarketing is more than sufficient, and the rule fallscomfortably within the boundaries of the First Amendment.  See Edenfield v. Fane,507 U.S. 761, 774-77 (1993) (invalidating ban on personal solicitation byaccountants, despite similar ban for lawyers, because lawyers are more likely toengage in overreaching and other forms of misconduct than accountants, and “theconstitutionality of a ban on personal solicitation will depend on the identity of theparties and the precise circumstances of the solicitation”).4 I. The Legislative Record Underlying The Federal Trade Commission’sDo Not Call Rule Demonstrates That Commercial Telemarketing Is FarMore Intrusive Than Non-Commercial Telemarketing. When Congress began investigating the state of telemarketing in the early1990s, it found that commercial telemarketing was by far the most intrusive type oftelemarketing.  After holding a series of hearings that ultimately led to passage ofthe Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), Congress concludedthat “most unwanted telephone solicitations are commercial in nature” and “thatunwanted commercial calls are a far bigger problem than unsolicited calls frompolitical or charitable organizations.”  H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 16 (1991)(Submitted by former Chairman Dingell) (emphasis added).5  
the problems of commercial telemarketing.  As a result, the FTC “considered, amongother things, the approach taken by Congress and the FCC in the TCPA and itsimplementing regulations” when enacting its “Do Not Call” rules.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4591. Accordingly, as this Court already has recognized, the history of the TCPA also bears onthe review of the FTC’s “Do Not Call” rules.  See Order, at 14 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 2003).  
5
This conclusion was not mere speculation – it was backed by Congressionaltestimony as well as hard data.  Among those who testified about the problem,there was a clear consensus that people consider commercial calls to be far moreannoying and invasive than charitable calls.  For example, in 1991, RobertBulmash of Private Citizen, Inc., a consumer group dedicated to protecting privacyrights, testified that “[t]he rating of consumer non-acceptance on telemarketing, is,first and foremost, automatic dialing sales; then live sales; then charity; thenlegitimate survey research, and then finally, on the lowest level of annoyance ispolitical calls.”  Hearing on S. 1462, S. 1410 & S. 857 Before the Subcomm. onCommunications of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transport., 102d Cong.,at 26 (1991).  Similarly, Michael Jacobson, Co-founder of the Center for the Studyof Commercialism, another public interest group, testified that “[t]he very idea ofhaving the sanctity of one’s home invaded by these commercial intruders isoffensive.”  Id. at 40 (emphasis added).The Bulmash and Jacobson testimony confirmed what Members of Congresshave been hearing from constituents for years – that calls from commercialtelemarketers are more invasive than non-charitable solicitations.  As
6Representative Markey stated during the debate that led to the TCPA, “[m]anyconsumers complain bitterly that when [the telephone] rings to deliver unsolicitedadvertising, it is invading their privacy.”  136 Cong. Rec. H5820 (July 30, 1990). Representative Fish similarly noted during debate surrounding the 1991 legislation:“Over the years, I have heard an increasing number of complaints fromconstituents who have been harassed by unsolicited sales calls.”  137 Cong. Rec.H10343 (Nov. 18, 1991).  See also id. (statement by Rep. Rinaldo noting that“nonprofit organizations” do not engage in practices that “annoy[]” individuals).  The finding that commercial calls are far more annoying to consumers thancharitable solicitations was also documented in the House and Senate reports onthe TCPA.  For example, the House Report cites studies conducted by twotelephone companies, which found that “Sales/solicitation andComputer/advertising calls, respectively were the most often mentioned type ofproblem or annoyance call.”  See H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 8-9.  The HouseReport also cites a study by the National Association of Consumer AgencyAdministrators, which found that just ten percent of complaints abouttelemarketing involved charitable calls.  See id. at 16-17.  The Senate Reportsimilarly highlighted commercial telemarketing as the central source of annoyanceto individuals.  See S. Rep. No. 102-177, at 2 (1991) (“[T]hose who complain . . .cite the following problem[]: . . .  telemarketers disturb consumers in the privacy of
6 As a result, when Congress passed the TCPA, requiring the FCC to initiate a“rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential telephone subscribers’privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), it excludedtax-exempt nonprofit organizations from its coverage, see id. at § 227(a)(3)(C).  Congressalso exempted survey research calls from coverage under the 1991 Act because theevidence showed that those types of calls, like charitable solicitations, were consideredless invasive by recipients.  See H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 13.
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their homes with unsolicited sales pitches for undesired goods or services[.]”).6 Three years later, when Congress considered the Telemarketing andConsumer Fraud Abuse Prevention Act of 1994 (“TCFPA”), the statute orderingthe FTC’s involvement in the problem of deceptive and abusive telemarketingpractices, a similar pattern emerged.  Once again, it was clear that commercial callsare considered far more intrusive by consumers than charitable calls – in partbecause commercial callers tend to be more aggressive.  Indeed, the telemarketersadmitted to this problem themselves.  Richard A. Barton, vice president of theDirect Marketing Association, a trade association whose membership includestelemarketers, testified about complaints from senior citizens regardingtelemarketers who are “screaming at them over the phone and using curse wordsand calling them all sorts of names to try to get them to buy” products.  Hearing onH.R. 868 Before the Subcomm. on Transport. & Hazardous Materials of theComm. on Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong., at 37 (testimony of Richard Barton)(1993).  See also H.R. Rep. No. 103-20, at 4-5 (1993) (Submitted by formerChairman Dingell) (recognizing that commercial calls are “coercive of a
8consumer’s right to privacy”).  Notably, none of the witnesses or other evidencebefore Congress identified similar problems by charitable telemarketers.  Most recently, during various Congressional debates about the Do Not Callrule itself, the record yet again pointed to commercial telemarketing – notcharitable telemarketing – as particularly intrusive to individuals and families. Representative Holt summed up the sentiments that numerous Members ofCongress have heard from their constituents when he said, “The residents of mydistrict have pleaded with me to do something so that they can have a peacefulfamily dinner, not interrupted by credit card solicitations or the latest condominiumofferings on some tropical locale.”  149 Cong. Rec. H408 (Feb. 12, 2003). Representative Schakowsky expressed a similar sentiment:  “Who has not had thattime [with our families] interrupted by commercial telemarketers?  We all knowfrom personal experience how intrusive these calls can be.”  Id. (emphasis added). See also Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong.(2003) (noting that “many” deem “[u]nwanted telemarketing . . . to be an outrightinvasion of privacy” and that excepting charitable solicitations is a matter of“common sense”) (statement of Rep. Dingell).The most recent testimony before Congress on this issue also confirmed thatconsumers are far less resentful of charitable calls – and do not express the sameanimus toward non-commercial telemarketers.  For example, in April 2003, theChairman of the FTC testified before the House Appropriations Committee that
9“we’ve found that consumers overwhelmingly do not resent the charitable calls theway they represent the calls from the non-charities.”  Hearing Before theSubcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State & Judiciary of the House AppropriationsComm., 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC). Moreover, the record before Congress indicated that consumers – whom the DoNot Call rule seeks to protect – view the rule’s treatment of charitable solicitationsfavorably, providing further evidence that citizens are less likely to find charitablesolicitations intrusive or annoying.  As Chairman Muris testified, “surveys ofconsumers in those states [with “do not call” rules] . . . indicate[] that consumerslike their . . . rule including the charitable exemption.”  Hearing Before the HouseComm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Timothy J.Muris, Chairman, FTC).Citizens tend to receive charitable solicitations more warmly in part becausecharities are more concerned about keeping their donor base – and thus therecipients of their calls – happy.  Unlike commercial telemarketers, who typicallyseek to make just one isolated sale, charitable solicitors have a far greater stake inmaintaining positive relationships with those they call.  As Chairman Muristestified, “My experience with the charities and a lot of people’s experiences, theydon’t want to offend their donor base and that if you tell them to don’t call you andsend a letter, that they’ll send you a letter.”  Id.  The FTC explicitly relied on this
10
rationale in promulgating the challenged rules.  See 68 Fed. Reg. at 4637 (notingthat likelihood of pattern of abusive calls is less for nonprofits because theindividual called “is more than a potential source of income[], he or she is also avoter, a constituent, a consumer, a source of information to others” and thus can bealienated “against the cause not just against the caller or their organization”). In short, Congress has established a weighty record, over more than a dozenyears of debate, indicating that the  “annoying ring on the phone” is far moreannoying when the person on the other end is “calling to sell something,” 149Cong. Rec. H408 (Rep. Tauzin) (Feb. 12, 2003), rather than to solicit contributionsto a charity – and that they want the government to do something about it.  SeeComment of Rep. Baldacci to FTC (Jan. 28, 2002) (“I have heard from many [ofmy constituents] about the unwelcome intrusion of sales calls and theineffectiveness of current methods to eliminate the calls.”).  That record is by itselfsufficient – indeed, far more than sufficient in light of the deference owed tolegislative judgments under the Central Hudson standard – to justify the FTC’sdifferential treatment of commercial telemarketing and charitable solicitation in theDo Not Call rule.  II. The Legislative Record Underlying The Federal Trade Commission’sDo Not Call Rule Demonstrates That Commercial Telemarketing Is FarMore Prone To Abuse Than Non-Commercial Telemarketing.The legislative record indicates that commercial telemarketing is not onlymore invasive than charitable solicitation but also far more prone to abuse.  This
11
concern, too, has been raised consistently throughout more than a decade ofCongressional inquiry into the telemarketing problem.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the evidence of abuse that led to passage of theTCFAPA in 1994 focused almost exclusively on people who want to sellsomething.  Witness after witness cited abusive sales practices – not abuse bycharities.  For example, John F. Barker, vice president of the National ConsumersLeague, testified that “many of the calls we receive, especially from older people,report instances of smooth talking promoters who call repeatedly trying to coercethem into purchasing beauty products, cameras, piles of dirt and offshore currencyfutures rebates.”  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transport. & HazardousMaterials of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong., at 31 (1993)(testimony of John F. Barker).  During floor debate on the legislation, Members ofCongress similarly highlighted the core telemarketing abuses that Congress soughtto address – all of which, once again, involved commercial solicitations.  AsSenator Hollings stated, “consumers are frequently lured into purchasing goodsand services with offers of investment opportunities, fabulous prizes, deluxevacations, and even household products such as vitamins, all at little or no cost.” 139 Cong. Rec. S8376 (June 30, 1993).  Other sales scams that came to the attention of Congress included“everything from the fraudulent sale of major investments . . . [to] water filters,
12
travel certificates, and cheap rubber dinghies.”  H.R. Rep. 103-20, at 2-5 (Feb. 24,1993).  See also S. Rep. 103-80, at 2 (June 29, 1993) (listing other fraudulentcommercial schemes).  And perhaps of greatest concern from a consumerprotection standpoint, Congress also heard reports of fraud in the sale of varioushealth care products by telephone.  See 139 Cong. Rec. S8376-77 (SenatorMcCain) (June 30, 1993) (noting the particularly acute problem of fraudulentmarketing of health-related products and services).  Once again, none of thesescams involves charities.  What is more, debate over passage of the USAPATRIOT Act in 2001, which expanded the coverage of the TCFAPA to includesolicitations made on behalf of charities, evidenced that fraud associated with thetelemarketing of goods and services overwhelmingly exceeds the fraud associatedwith all charitable contributions.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6101(3) with 147 Cong.Rec. S10065 (Senator McConnell) (Oct. 2, 2001).In short, notwithstanding the TCFAPA’s partial success in combatingtelemarketing fraud, there is no question that telemarketing fraud continues – andthat the most serious problems are in the area of sales.  As former FTC ChairmanRobert Pitofsky testified in 1998, “[p]rize and sweepstakes promotions generatemore consumer complaints in the Commission’s complaint database than any othertype of telemarketing.”  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice,State & the Judiciary of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 105th Cong. (1998)(statement of Robert Pitofsky, former Chairman, FTC).  See also 149 Cong. Rec. 
13
S11964 (Senator Pryor) (Sept. 25, 2003) (“[W]e all know that fraud can very muchbe a problem when it comes to telemarketing.”)  For this reason too, the FTC’sdecision to limit the general Do Not Call rule to the commercial context was areasonable fit to address the telemarketing problems that have been identified byCongress and the Commission over the last twelve years.ConclusionAs the Supreme Court’s decisions have made clear, Congress may regulatecommercial speech so long as there is a “reasonable” – not “perfect” – fit betweenthe problem addressed by the regulation and the government’s solution.  Fox, 492U.S. at 480; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at433-34.  The regulation need not be the “single best disposition” of a problem,Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, and it need not be supported by scientific certainty or data.  Itis enough that “simple common sense” supports the government’s judgment that aparticular regulation will help to alleviate a genuine problem.  Florida Bar, 515U.S. at 628.The Do Not Call rule’s different treatment of commercial telemarketing andcharitable solicitation easily satisfies – indeed, far exceeds – that standard.  Thelegislative record underlying the Do Not Call rule speaks for itself.  Time andagain, individuals have made clear to Congress that commercial calls – notcharitable calls – are the most annoying and thus most invasive of their privacyinterests.  Moreover, Congress has collected substantial evidence that fraud andabuse problems are associated more closely with commercial than with non-commercial telemarketing.  In short, there is over a decade’s worth of legislativefindings that the bulk of telemarketing problems originally arose, and still arise,from commercial calls.  That is more than enough to show the requisite“reasonable fit” between the FTC’s new rules and the problems they seek toaddress.In evaluating the distinction drawn between commercial and charitable calls,this Court should be mindful that the government has not simply banned one typeof call while permitting the other.  Instead, with respect to both  commercial andcharitable calls, the law leaves to each citizen the decision of which calls to permitand which to forbid.  The difference, as explained above, see supra at 2-3, is in thedefault rule:  commercial calls are not to be made to those who sign up for theregistry – unless the individual authorizes an entity-specific exception; charitable
14
calls may be made – but again, subject to a citizen’s choice to make an entity-specific exception.  Amici believe that the legislative record in this case wouldjustify regulation that more definitely distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial calls.  But it surely justifies this common-sense allocation of defaultrules, which leaves the ultimate choice in each case to the individual. 
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